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ABSTRACT

the identity of the signer. That is, under the assumption
that each user is already associated with a public key of
some standard signature scheme, a user can form a group
by simply collecting the public keys of all the group members including his own. These diversion group members can
be totally unaware of being conscripted into the group.
Ring signature schemes could be used for whistle blowing [24], anonymous membership authentication for ad hoc
groups [8] and many other applications which do not want
complicated group formation stage but require signer anonymity. For example, in the whistle blowing scenario, a whistleblower gives out a secret as well as a ring signature of the
secret to the public. From the signature, the public can be
sure that the secret is indeed provided by a group member
while they will not be able to figure out who the whistleblower is. At the same time, the whistleblower does not need
any collaboration of other users who have been conscripted
by him into the group of members associated with the ring
signature. Hence, the anonymity of the whistleblower is ensured and the public is also certain that the secret is indeed
leaked by one of the group members associated with the ring
signature.
Ring signature scheme can be used to derive other primitives as well. It had been utilized to construct non-interactive
deniable ring authentication [27], perfect concurrent signature [28] and multi-designated verifiers signature [21].
Many reductionist security proofs used the random oracle
model [4]. Several papers proved that some popular cryptosystems previously proved secure in the random oracle are
actually provably insecure when the random oracle is instantiated by any real-world hashing functions [10, 2]. Thus, it is
natural to design a practical ring signature scheme provably
secure without requiring random oracles.
Subsequently, there are some ring signature schemes that
do not rely on random oracles exist in the literature. Xu et
al. [31] described a ring signature scheme in the standard
model. But the proof is not rigorous and is apparently flawed
[5]. Chow et al. [15] gave a ring signature scheme with proof
in the standard model, though it is based on a strong new
assumption. Bender et al. [5] presented a ring signature secure in the standard model assuming trapdoor permutations
exists. Their scheme uses generic ZAPs for NP as a building

In this paper, we present the notion and construction of
threshold ring signature without random oracles. This is
the first scheme in the literature that is proven secure in the
standard model. Our scheme extends the Shacham-Waters
signature from PKC 2007 in a non-trivial way. We note that
our technique is specifically designed to achieve a threshold ring signature in the standard model. Interestingly, we
can still maintain the signature size to be the same as the
Shacham-Waters signature, while only a tiny computation
cost is added.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ring Signature. A ring signature scheme (such as [24,
1, 32, 6, 30, 19, 16]) allows members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group without the need to reveal their
identities, i.e., providing signer anonymity. Additionally, it
is not possible to decide whether two signatures have been
issued by the same group member. Different from a group
signature scheme (such as [13, 9, 3]), the group formation
is spontaneous and there exists no group manager to revoke
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• Gp is its cyclic order-p subgroup, and Gq is its cyclic
order-q subgroup

block, which may not be practical. Shacham and Waters [26] proposed an efficient ring signature scheme without
using random oracles, based on standard assumption. They
rely on composite order pairing that results for a trusted setup procedure. Very recently, Schäge and Schwenk [25] gave
another ring signature scheme in the standard model using
basic assumption. In contrast to the previous construction,
they used prime order pairing instead. However, their security model does not allow the adversary to query any private
key.
All the above mentioned ring signature schemes only allow
one single signer, which is also known as 1-out-of-n ring
signature scheme [1].

• g is a generator of G, while h is a generator of Gq .
• GT is a multiplicative group of order n.
• ê is a bilinear map such that e : G × G → GT with the
following properties:
– Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z,
ê(ua , v b ) = ê(u, v)ab .
– Non-degeneracy: ⟨ê(g, g)⟩ = GT whenever ⟨g⟩ =
G.
– Computability: It is efficient to compute ê(u, v)
for all u, v ∈ G.

Threshold Ring Signature. A (d, n)-threshold ring signature has the similar notion to the (1-out-of-n) ring signature. First, a (d, n)-threshold ring signature scheme requires at least t signers to work jointly for generating a signature. Second, the anonymity of signers is preserved both
inside and outside the signing group. Third, those t participating signers can choose any set of n entities including
themselves without getting any consent from those diversion group members. The first threshold ring signature was
proposed by Bresson et al. [8] in 2002 which is followed by
Wong et al. [30] in 2003. Both of them extend the 1-out-of-n
ring signature from [24] in a different way. However, the idea
of proving “Knowing d solutions out of n problem instance”
[17] was proposed in the early 90s. Liu et al. [22] changed
the idea into threshold ring signature for separate key types.
Subsequently, different types of setting or construction such
as ID-based [14], certificateless-based [12], code-based [23,
18] and lattice-based [11] have also been proposed. However, all previous threshold ring signature schemes in the
literature (regardless the underlying cryptosystem or construction) can be proven secure in the random oracle or ideal
cipher model only1 .

• GT,p and GT,q are the GT -subgroups of order p and q,
respectively.
• The group operations on G and GT can be performed
efficiently.
• Bit strings corresponding to elements of G and of GT
can be recognized efficiently.

2.2 Mathematical Assumptions
For our scheme, we assume two problems are difficult to
solve in the setting described above: computational DiffieHellman in Gp and the Subgroup Decision Problem.
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman in Gp ).
Given the tuple (r, ra , rb ), where r ∈R Gp , and a, b ∈R Zp ,
compute and output rab . In the composite setting one is
additionally given the description of the larger group G, including the factorization (p, q) of its order n.
Definition 2 (Subgroup Decision). Given w selected at random either from G (with probability 1/2) or from
Gq (with probability 1/2), decide whether w is in Gq . For
this problem one is given the description of G, but not given
the factorization of n.

1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we propose the first threshold ring signature scheme provable secure without random oracles. It is a
threshold extension of the Shacham-Waters (SW) signature
[26]. However, we have to note that the extension is not
trivial. The typical secret sharing technique cannot be used
in the ring signature case. The modified polynomial interpolation technique (e.g. [17, 22, 29]) requires random oracle
to instantiate a signature scheme. Thus, we emphasize that
our technique is specially designed for non-random oracle
security proof. Additionally, we can still maintain the signature size to be the same as the SW signature, while only
a tiny computation cost is added.

The assumptions are formalized by measuring an adversary’s success probability for computational Diffie-Hellman
and an adversary’s guessing advantage for the subgroup decision problem. Note that if CDH in Gp as we have formulated it is hard then so is CDH in G. The assumption that
the subgroup decision problem is hard is called Subgroup
Hiding (SGH) assumption, and was introduced by Boneh et
al [7].

3.

SECURITY MODEL

We give our security model and define relevant security
notions.

2. PRELIMINARIES

3.1 Syntax of threshold ring signature

2.1 Pairings

A threshold ring signature, (TRS) scheme, is a tuple of
four algorithms (KeyGen, Sign and Verify.

We make use of bilinear groups of composite order. Let n
be a composite number with factorization n = pq. We have

• (ski , pki ) ← KeyGen(λ) is a PPT algorithm which,
on input a security parameter λ ∈ N, outputs a private/public key pair (ski , pki ). We denote by SK and
PK the domains of possible secret keys and public
keys, resp. When we say that a public key corresponds to a secret key or vice versa, we mean that the secret/public key pair is an output of KeyGen.

• G is a multiplicative cyclic groups of order n.
1

Although Han et al. [20] claimed their threshold ring signature scheme is secure in the standard mode, Tsang et al.
[29] showed that their proof is incorrect. We do not regard
[20] as a provable secure scheme.
262

• param ← Setup(λ) is a PPT algorithm which, on input a security parameter λ, outputs the set of security
parameters param which includes λ.

(3) At most (d − 1) of the public keys in Y have been
input to CO.
(4) (M, Y) is not a query input to SO.

• σ ′ =(n,d,Y,σ)← Sign(e, n, d, Y, X , M ) which, on input
a group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of
n public keys in PK, a set X of d private keys whose
corresponding public keys are all contained in Y, and
a message M , produces a signature σ.

We denote by
Advunf
A (λ) = Pr[A wins the game ].
Definition 3 (unforgeability). A TRS scheme
is unforgeable if for all PPT adversary A, Advunf
A (λ)
is negligible.

• accept/reject ← Verify(n, d, Y, M, σ) which, on input a
group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n
public keys in PK, a message-signature pair (M ,σ) returns accept or reject. If accept, the message-signature
pair is valid.

2. Anonymity.
Anonymity for TRS schemes is defined in the following
game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A
in which A is given access to oracles J O, CO and SO:

3.1.1 Correctness.
TRS schemes must satisfy: Verification Correctness. That
is, all signatures signed according to specification are accepted during verification.

(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters
param.

3.2 Notions of Security of threshold ring signature

(b) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy. Suppose A makes a total number of
v queries to CO. The restriction is that: v < n−d.

Security of TRS schemes has two aspects: unforgeability
and anonymity. Before giving their definition, we consider
the following oracles which together model the ability of the
adversaries in breaking the security of the schemes.

(c) A gives S a group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n},
message M , and a set Y of n public keys all of
which are query outputs of J O. S picks randomly
a subset V of Y with |V| = d, such that V is not
contained in any of the queries to SO and CO.
Let X be a set of secret keys with |X | = d and
whose corresponding public keys are all contained
in V. S computes σ ′ = Sign ( n, d, Y, V, X , M ).

• pki ← J O(⊥). The Joining Oracle, on request, adds
a new user to the system. It returns the public key
pk ∈ PK of the new user.
• ski ← CO(pki ). The Corruption Oracle, on input a
public key pki ∈ PK that is a query output of J O,
returns the corresponding secret key ski ∈ SK.

(d) A queries the oracles adaptively. Suppose A makes
a total number of v ′ queries to CO. The restriction is that: v ′ < n − d − v. If any of the queries
to SO or CO contains a public key y such that
pk ∈ Y, S halts.

• σ ′ ← SO(n, d, Y, V, M ). The Signing Oracle, on input
a group size n, a threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n
public keys, a signer subset V of Y with |V| = d, and
a message M , returns a valid signature σ ′ .

(e) A outputs an index π̂.
We denote by

Remark: An alternative approach to specify the SO is to
exclude the signer set V from the input and have SO select
it according to suitable random distribution. We do not
pursue that alternative further.

AdvAnon
(λ) = Pr[π̂ ∈ Y] −
A

d
.
n − (v + v ′ )

Definition 4 (Anonymity). A TRS scheme is
anonymous if for any PPT adversary A, AdvAnon
(λ)
A
is negligible.

1. Unforgeability.
Unforgeability for LTRS schemes is defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles J O, CO
and SO:

Summarizing we have:
Definition 5 (Security of TRS Schemes). A TRS scheme
is secure if it is unforgeable and anonymous.

(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters
param.

4.

(b) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy.
(c) A gives S a group size n ∈ N, a threshold d ∈
{1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a message M ∈ M and a signature σ ∈ Σ.

OUR PROPOSED THRESHOLD RING SIGNATURE SCHEME

4.1

Construction

We extend the 1-out-of-n SW ring signature scheme [26]
into a d-out-of-n threshold setting.

A wins the game if:

• Setup: The setup algorithm runs the bilinear group
generator (N = pq, G, GT , ê) ← G(1λ ). Suppose the
group generator G also gives the generators g1 , B0 , u,
u1 , . . . , uk ∈ G, h1 ∈ Gq and α ∈ ZN . Set g2 = g1α and

(1) Verify(·)=accept.
(2) All of the public keys in Y are query outputs of
J O.
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∗
∗
k
h2 = hα
1 . Let H : N × G × {0, 1} → {0, 1} be a collision resistant hash function. The public parameters
are

Check correctness:
ê(S2 , u

k
∏

m

uj j ) · ê(g2 , B0d C)

j=1

(N, G, GT , ê, g1 , g2 , B0 , h1 , h2 , u, u1 , . . . , uk , H).
Everyone can check the validity of g1 , g2 , h1 , h2 using
pairings.

=ê(

d
∏

S2,i , u

i=1

=ê(
• KeyGen: For user i, he picks a random xi ∈ ZN . His
public key is g1si and his secret key is g2si .

d
∏

k
∏

m

uj j ) · ê(g2 , hx1

j=1

g1ri , u

i=1

k
∏

k
∏

m

uj j ) ·

d
∏

ê(g2 , g1si ) · ê(g2 , hx1 )

i=1

m

uj j )

∑d
i=1

ri

)·

j=1

• Sign: Suppose Y = {pk1 , . . . , pkn } is the user ring.
X is the set of private keys of d participating signers,
who cooperate to generate the ring signature for the
message M . Without loss of generality, suppose that
{1, 2, . . . , d} is the indices of participating signers, and
{d + 1, ......, n} is the indices of non-signers.
Define fi such that
{
fi =

=ê(g1 ,

d
∏

ê(g2si , g1 ) · ê(g2 , hx1 )

i=1

g2si (u

i=1

k
∏

m

∑d

uj j )

i=1

ri

) · ê(g1 , hx2 )

j=1

d
∏
x

=ê(g1 , h2

S1,i )

i=1

=ê(g1 , S1 )
1
0

4.2

if i = 1, . . . , d,
if i = d + 1, . . . , n.

d
∏

g1si

where

x=

i=1

n
∑

Proof. Setup. The simulator B runs the bilinear group
generator (N = pq, G, GT , ê) ← G(1λ ). B is given the CDH
problem instance (g, g a , g b ) ∈ G3p and is asked to output g ab .
B first sets an integer, µ = 4qe , and chooses an integer, κ,
uniformly at random between 0 and k. B picks x′ , x1 , . . . , xk
uniformly at random between 0 and µ−1. B randomly picks
pγ
a γ ∈ ZN and sets z1 = g q . Since g ∈ Gp , z1 is in Gq . Also
z1b can be computed from g b .
B randomly picks a generator h1 ∈ Gq . B randomly picks
y ′ , y1 , . . . , yk , α, β ∈ ZN and sets

xi .

i=1

2. Each signer i computes (m1 , . . . , mk ) = H(d, Y,
M ). He picks a random ri ∈ ZN and computes
S1,i = g2si (u

k
∏

g1 = gz1 ,
m
uj j )ri ,

S2,i = g1ri .

3. After collecting (S1,i , S2,i ) from the t signers, calculate
S1,i ,

S2 =

i=1

d
∏

...,

′

′

u = g2N −κµ+x g y ,
x

uk = g2 k g yk ,

h 2 = hα
1,

(N, G, GT , ê, g1 , g2 , B0 , h1 , h2 , u, u1 , . . . , uk , H)
S2,i .

to the adversary A. For a message m = {m1 , . . . , mk }, we
define

i=1

The signature is (S1 , S2 , {Ci , πi }n
i=1 ).

F (m) = (N − µκ) + x′ +

k
∑

xi mi ,

J(m) = y ′ +

i=1

• Verify: On input (n, d, Y, M, σ), first compute (m1 , . . .,
mk ) = H(d, Y, M ). For i = 1, . . . , n, check if
ê(Ci , Ci ) = ê(h1 , πi ) · ê(Ci ,
If they are true, compute C =
ê(S1 , g1 ) = ê(S2 , u

k
∏

∏n
i=1

B0 = hβ1 .

α
Note that ê(g1 , h2 ) = ê(z1 , hα
1 ) = ê(z1 , h1 ) = ê(g2 , h1 ), since ê(g, h1 ) = 1. Finally, B randomly chooses a collision
resistant hash function H : N × G∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k .
Then B gives the public parameters

Signer i sends (S1,i , S2,i ) to the signer in step 1.

d
∏

g2 = g a z1α ,

u1 = g2x1 g y1 ,

j=1

S1 = hx2

Security Proof

Theorem 1. The threshold ring signature scheme is unforgeable against insider corruption if the CDH assumption
holds in Gp .

1. For i = 1, . . . , n, one of the signer picks xi ∈R ZN
and sets
(
)xi
( g si )fi
( g si )2fi −1
xi
xi
1
1
Ci =
h1 , π i =
h1
.
B0
B0
∏
Let C = n
i=1 Ci . Then we have
B0d C = hx1

d
∏

g1si )

i=1

j=1

=ê(g1 , (u

d
∏

k
∑

yi mi .

i=1

Assume B picks τ as the challenge signer. For i = 1, . . . , n,
B picks random si ∈ ZN and sets:
{
g1si
if i ̸= τ ,
pki =
g b z1b if i = τ .

g1si
).
B0

Ci and check if:

B stores the set of public keys {pki }n
i=1 .
Oracle Simulation. B simulates the oracles as follows:

m

uj j ) · ê(g2 , B0d C).

• J O: on the i-th query, B returns pki .

j=1
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• CO(pki ): If i = τ , B declares failure and exits. Otherwise, B returns g2si .

Let δ ∈ ZN such that δ = 0 mod q and δ = 1 mod p. If
we raise equation 1 to the δ-th power, then we have

• SO(n, d, Y, V, M ): On input a message M , a set of n
public keys Y = {pki′ }n
i=1 , and a set of d signers V,
B calculates (Ci , πi ) according to the Sign algorithm.
Note that no secret key is required to generate (Ci , πi ).
Then we have
∏ s
B0d C = hx1
g1 i .

ê(S1∗ , g1 )δ = ê(S2∗ , u

S1,τ = (g )

(u

(u

u

k
∏

m∗
j

uj

F (m∗ ) J(m∗ )

m
uj j )rτ ,

′

since x +

∑k
i=1

k
∏

δ

pki fi ri′ δ
pki fi δ
) z1 ) = (
) ,
B0
B0

since z1 ∈ Gq .
From equation 4, we can see that
∏
δ
J(m∗ )
·(
g si fi · g b )a )δ ,
S1∗ = (S2∗

m

uj j )rτ ,

i|i∈Y ∗ ,i̸=τ

Therefore B can output
A = (S1∗ (S2∗ )−J(m

m

uj j )r̄ ,

∗

)

Analysis. Following the probability analysis of Waters signature, the probability of F (m) ̸= 0 mod N during signing
∑
1
oracle query and x + ki=1 xi m∗i = µκ is at least 8(k+1)q
.
s
The probability of not asking pkτ in the corruption oracle
is 1 − qnc . The probability of fτ = 1 in the output phase is
d∗
. Therefore B solves the CDH problem with probability
n∗

Finally, B calculates the rest of the signature according
to the Sign algorithm.

ϵ≥

Output. A returns (n∗ , d∗ , Y ∗ , M ∗ , σ ∗ ). Denote m∗ = (m∗1 ,
. . . , m∗k ) = H(d∗ , Y ∗ , M ∗ ). Note that this hash value is different from previous m in various SO queries, since (d∗ , Y ∗ ,
M ∗ ) cannot be the input of previous SO queries and H
is a ∑
collision resistant hash function. If pkτ ∈
/ Y ∗ and
k
′
∗
x + i=1 xi mi ̸= µκ, then B aborts. Otherwise, WLOG,
we assume that pkτ is at the position τ of the signature σ ∗ .
Since σ ∗ is a valid signature, then
∗

uj j ) · ê(g2 , B0d

j=1

ê(Ci∗ , Ci∗ )

=

ê(h1 , πi∗ )

·

n
∏

Ci∗ ),

Theorem 2. The threshold ring signature scheme is anonymous against full key exposure if the subgroup hiding assumption holds.
Proof. Setup. The simulator B is given the subgroup
decision problem instance (N, G, GT , ê, g, h). B is asked to
determine whether h ∈ G or h ∈ Gq . B randomly picks the
generators u, u1 , . . . uk , B0 ∈ G and α ∈ ZN . B sets

(1)

i=1

ê(Ci∗ ,

pki
).
B0

g1 = g,
(2)

g2 = g1α ,

h1 = h,

h 2 = hα .

Finally, B randomly chooses a collision resistant hash function H : N × G∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k . Then B gives the public
parameters

for i = 1, . . . , n∗ . Since ê(h1 , πi∗ ) has order q in GT , therefore
B0 Ci∗
either Ci∗ or pk
has order q from equation 2. B checks
i
if (Ci∗ )q = 0. If it is true, then Ci∗ has prder q and then B
B0 Ci∗
has order q and then B sets
sets fi = 0. Otherwise, pk
i
Ci∗

d∗
qc
(1 − ),
8(k + 1)qs n∗
n

where qs , qc , n is the number of SO, CO and J O respectively.

∗

m∗

(g a )−si fi )δ ,

as the solution to the CDH problem.

The simulator will be able to perform this computation
if and only if F (m) ̸= 0 mod N . For ease of analysis
the simulator will ∑
only continue in the sufficient condition where x′ + ki=1 xi mi ̸= 0 mod µ. (If we have
∑
x′ + ki=1 xi mi ̸= 0 mod µ, this implies F (m) ̸= 0
mod N since we can assume N > kµ for any reasonable values of N, k, and µ).

k
∏

∏
i|i∈Y ∗ ,i̸=τ

j=1

ê(S1∗ , g1 ) = ê(S2∗ , u

∗

= g J(m ) ,

xi m∗i = µκ. Also

Ci∗ = ((

b
F (m) J(m) rτ − F (m)
g2b (g2
,
g
)

= g2b (u

g

= g2

j=1

=

(g si )fi · g b )δ .

j=1

k
∏

k
∏

· ê(g ,

For equation 3, note that

then
−J(m)
F (m)

∏

a

(4)

−1

S1,τ = (g b )

=

∗
ê(S2∗ , g J(m ) )δ

pki fi δ
) ) , (3)
B0

i|i∈Y ∗ ,i̸=τ

S2,τ = (g b z1b ) F (m) (gz1 )rτ .
b
,
F (m)

(

i|i∈Y ∗

ê(S1∗ , g)δ

Ci∗ )δ ,

i|i∈Y ∗

∏

∗

ê(S1∗ , g)δ = ê(S2∗ , g J(m ) )δ · ê(g a , B0d

j=1

Let r̄ = rτ −

∏

∗

∗

Denote m = H(d, Y, M ). We also write m into k bits
∑
{m1 , . . . , mk }. If x′ + ki=1 xi mi ≡ 0 mod µ, then B
aborts. For all pki ∈ V and i ̸= τ , B calculates all
(S1,i , S2,i ) according to the Sign algorithm. If pkτ ∈
V,B chooses a random rτ ∈ ZN and calculates
−J(m)
F (m)

m∗

uj j )δ · ê(g2 , B0d

j=1

i|pki ∈V

b

k
∏

(N, G, GT , ê, g1 , g2 , B0 , h1 , h2 , u, u1 , . . . , uk , H)
to the adversary A.
For i = 1, . . . , n, B picks random si ∈ ZN and sets:

′
i fi ri
) z1
( pk
B0

for some unknown
fi = 1. It follows that
=
ri′ , no matter fi = 0/1. If fτ = 0, B aborts.

pki = g1si ,
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ski = g2si .

B stores the set of public keys and secret keys {pki , ski }n
i=1 .

4.3

Oracle Simulation. B simulates the oracles as follows:

When comparing our scheme with the 1-out-of-n SW ring
signature scheme, the size of our signature is exactly the
same as the SW scheme. In terms of computation cost,
the overall signing process only increases by some elliptic
curve addition operations. However, if it is measured as per
signer computation, each signer actually requires less, when
compared to the SW scheme. The verification algorithm
only requires 1 more exponentiation to the SW scheme.

• J O: on the i-th query, B returns pki .
• CO(pki ): B returns g2si .
• SO(n, d, Y, V, M ): B answers by running the Sign algorithm honestly.
Challenge. At some point, A outputs a message M ∗ , a set
of n∗ public keys Y ∗ and a threshold d∗ . B picks a random
subset V ∗ of Y ∗ with |V ∗ | = d∗ , such that V ∗ is not contained
in any query to CO. B uses the secret keys of V ∗ to run the
Sign algorithm to obtain the signature σ ∗ . B gives σ ∗ to A.

5.

Analysis. Suppose the challenge signature is (S1∗ , S2∗ , {Ci∗ ,
∗
∗
∗
∗
πi∗ }n
i=1 ) and Y = {pk1 , . . . , pkn∗ }. If h1 is a generator of
pk∗
G, there exist xi , x¯i ∈ ZN such that Ci∗ = ( B0i )hx1 i = hx1¯i .
∗
Then xi , x¯i correspond to the case fi = 0 or 1 respectively.
Denote by (πi∗ |fi∗ = b) the value of πi∗ if fi is set to b ∈ {0, 1}.
Then
( pk∗
)x
(πi∗ |fi∗ = 0) = ( i )hx1 i i = (hx1¯i )xi
B0
( pk∗
)x¯
xi x¯i
= (h1 ) = ( i )−1 hx1¯i i = (πi∗ |fi∗ = 1).
B0

6.

∗

∗

m

uj j ) · ê(g2 , B0d

j=1

∗

n
∏
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